⚡ Tim O Brien Character Analysis

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Tim O Brien Character Analysis



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Leviticus, Anchor Yale Bible Commentary. In other words, the rationale for turning to selection is the same in both the cultural and organic domains. As Darwin , noted, humans are regularly moved to act in ways that benefit others, even when those others are not members of extended families. This explanation has been updated across a long series of publications by Richerson, Boyd and others, who also aim to explain the very widespread tendencies of modern humans to share valuable resources across broad social networks e.

Richerson and Boyd , Richerson et al. Their view is that the resources of more mainstream evolutionary theory are not up to this explanatory task. Kin selection is insufficient, they say, because humans regularly share with people outside their immediate family groups. Moreover, they take the view that the Pleistocene social groups in which they believe these sharing behaviours evolved were probably too large for reciprocal altruism to explain their emergence.

Once cultural transmission has established this social environment, natural selection acting on genetic variation then favours an innate psychology that is suited to this new, socially-inherited set of environmental problems. The very idea of group selection is a controversial one. Many commentators have taken a sceptical view of group selection when underpinned by genetic inheritance, because of worries that competition based on genetic variation within groups will tend to undermine the effects of competition between groups.

Several cultural evolutionists e. Boyd and Richerson , Henrich have argued that cultural inheritance processes are better able than processes of genetic inheritance to sustain between-group differences, for they believe there is good empirical and theoretical evidence that cultural processes can maintain within-group homogeneity in the face of various countervailing factors immigration, unreliable imitation and so forth. Needless to say, this work is contentious. It is possible to challenge the claims made about the innateness of the social psychological dispositions in question, the characterisation of likely Pleistocene social groups, the inability of more traditional evolutionary resources to explain our altruistic tendencies, and so forth see Birch Such challenges are inevitable when a hypothesis is as ambitious as this one, and when it draws on such a variety of supporting sources of data.

There are also conceptual concerns. A recent paper lists three different forms of cultural group selection, of which straightforward competition between groups is just one variant Richerson et al. The authors also offer selective imitation by individuals of individuals in successful groups, and selective migration by individuals into successful groups, as two further types of cultural group selection. These are indeed additional ways by which behavioural traits that are of benefit to a group can increase in frequency in a larger population of groups. Because of this, thinking of them as forms of group selection may introduce confusion see also Morin Regardless of these worries, it is clear that the cultural group selection explanation for forms of altruistic behaviour marks a significant effort to synthesise theory and evidence across a wide set of domains.

A closely related way to vindicate models of cultural evolution looks to the question of the general features of inheritance systems that make for evolvability in a lineage. This project has been pioneered in recent years by Kim Sterelny e. Once again, let us illustrate the general nature of these issues by beginning in the organic realm. The basic conditions for natural selection do not, in spite of appearances, suffice for the appearance of functional traits. A system in which offspring resemble parents with respect to fitness-enhancing traits may not develop complex adaptations. The environment needs to cooperate: if selective pressures change very quickly then there will be no sustained environmental demands of the sort that might build complex adaptations over time.

Development also matters. If ontogeny is set up in such a way that changes to any one trait tend to be accompanied by changes to all other traits, then the chances are that cumulative adaptation will be particularly hard to come by. For even in those cases where a mutation contributes positively to the function of one trait, the chances are that it will contribute negatively to overall fitness in virtue of its disruption of the functioning of other traits. Development also needs to make a wide range of variation available. If it is highly constrained, so that only a small number of forms are possible, then selection is not presented with a broad enough range of raw materials from which to fashion complex traits.

This occurs when individual organisms go it alone, sabotaging complex features of group organisation in favour of their own fitness. Individual-level selection, in contrast, can build individual-level adaptations. By applying these sorts of considerations to the cultural realm we can attempt to understand the likely costs and benefits associated with various different forms of cultural inheritance vertical, oblique, meme-like and so forth.

We can also perhaps come to an understanding of the different evolutionary forces that might bring these different forms of cultural inheritance into existence. And, in turn, these insights may facilitate comparative work that seeks to document the general conditions that are required for a species to make use of cultural inheritance in order to build complex adaptations such as tools. This way of thinking offers the promise, for example, of explaining why few, if any, non-human species are able to build progressively more and more complex cultural features in a cumulative manner Richerson and Boyd , ; see also Laland The exploration of the significance of these conditions in the cultural realm is contentious, partly because the conditions for evolvability themselves are disputed see Godfrey-Smith Questions relating to evolvability are also tied up with difficult issues relating to the units-of-selection debate Okasha Does something like this occur in the cultural realm?

Does selection on human groups act so as to limit the ability of individual humans to go it alone? In what ways might cultural inheritance be involved in these processes? These questions are complex, both in terms of how they should be posed and how they should be answered. But some of the most interesting work in cultural evolutionary theory may come from efforts to answer them. Issues relating to evolvability are sometimes framed in terms of systems of information transfer. On this view, if offspring are to resemble parents, developmental information must be transmitted from one generation to the next. The question is what forms of information transmission system do this job. This mode of framing the issue is contentious, for it is not always clear how we are to understand the concept of information, and what it means for some causal contributor to development to count as an information-bearer, rather than some other kind of developmental participant, such as an information-reader, say, or a background condition for information transfer see Oyama and Griffiths for discussion of these issues.

Maynard Smith and Szathmary propose that we can think of these events as modifications to the mechanisms of inter-generational information transmission. Jablonka and Lamb argue that thinking in terms of information transmission systems also allows us to point out salient differences in the forms of social transmission underlying cultural evolution. They claim that only some forms of social transmission make use of a system of symbols. Consider, for example, that to say that some birds inherit their song by social transmission is not to say that birdsong is a symbolic system. Humans, on the other hand, trade in publicly-accessible symbols.

Moreover, repositories of symbols, most obviously in the form of libraries and computer databases, are vital inheritance systems for humans, allowing the preservation and accumulation of knowledge across generations. Note, also, that there are different types of symbol system. In some cases the relationship between a symbol and what is represented is arbitrary. Jablonka and Lamb use the characteristic differences between typical modes of social inheritance in animals and humans to illuminate the impact our own symbolic transmission systems have on human cultural evolution see also Deacon Although they argue that there can be non-linguistic symbolic systems , , language exemplifies nicely the way in which systems of symbols contain elements that can be recombined in countless ways to yield a vast array of different meaningful messages.

Repositories of symbolically stored information, such as books, can also be searched, annotated, edited and so forth, in ways that add to their power and versatility. This manner of thinking opens up a number of challenging issues. The question of the degree to which symbolic systems resemble other inheritance systems is an illuminating one. One quickly realises that any attempt to say precisely what makes some inheritance system a symbolic system, and any attempt to differentiate between types of symbolic systems linguistic, non-linguistic and so forth , will be exceptionally philosophically demanding. Many evolutionists have argued that biological tools can have great value when we wish to develop a historical view of the pattern of cultural change see, for example, Gray at al , Mace and Holden this section itself draws on Lewens A variety of biological methods have been developed that help us to uncover the structure of evolutionary trees: they help us to understand which taxa split from which others and when.

It seems clear that cultural items of many kinds most obviously languages, but also tools and techniques also stand in recognizable genealogical relationships, and this has led many biological anthropologists to use phylogenetic methods borrowed or adapted from the biological sciences in order to reconstruct the history of borrowings in the cultural realm. Critics have sometimes followed Gould in arguing that these biological methods cannot be properly applied to the cultural realm, because cultural genealogies take the form of reticulated networks, rather than branching trees.

Cultural change is indeed often highly reticulated: it is obvious that a complex object like a car is a confluence of numerous technical lineages, which come together to form the hi-fi system, the engine, the safety devices, and so forth. Moreover, as improvements are made to cars these new developments may be borrowed by innovators of bicycles, furniture, toys and other shifting constellations of artifacts. These important observations need not undermine the project of cultural phylogeny.

Much of biological evolution is also reticulated. Bacteria, for example, do not form genealogically isolated lineages, hybridization is rife among plants, and there is also considerable borrowing of elements of the genome between apparently isolated mammalian species. But cultural evolutionists e. Gray et al. This kind of work is important, in part because of the uses to which well-confirmed cultural phylogenies can be put. It may be easiest to illustrate their value via a simple example. On the face of things, looking for correlations is a reasonable albeit fallible way to discover causal relationships. If, for example, people who smoke often get lung cancer, and people with lung cancer are often smokers, then we have good evidence that smoking causes lung cancer or perhaps that lung cancer causes smoking.

But there can be strong correlations that do not indicate causation. If, for example, we find that there is a strong correlation in animals between making a moo sound and producing large quantities of milk, we should not conclude that one causes the other. Mooing and milk production go together because the creatures in question share ancestors in common, who both mooed and gave lots of milk. Of course, in the case of cows this fact of common ancestry is so obvious that we hardly notice how it informs our causal inference. But cultural phylogenies are unobvious. Russell Gray, among others, has long argued that when we understand them better, our knowledge of phylogenies can then confirm, or undermine, causal hypotheses that are claimed on the basis of correlation.

Gray and Watts , for example, have scrutinised what is sometimes called the Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that belief in powerful gods, who inflict punishment on wrongdoers, tends to result in societies that are better able to harness the fruits of cooperation see Norenzayan et al. We must also take into account the potentially confounding consequences of shared ancestry among the societies surveyed. Gray and Watts draw on Austronesian data to argue that belief in moralising high gods tends to be gained after, not before, the emergence of political complexity; so these data, they suggest, undermine the thought that moralising high gods drive this form of complexity.

That said, they do find some support for a weaker supernatural punishment hypothesis based on belief in punishment interventions from natural spirits, ancestral spirits and mythical heroes, as well as from moralising high gods. Work such as this indicates the potential for cultural phylogenetics to inform broad-sweep hypotheses about not just the patterns, but also the causal processes, that have marked the cultural history of our species.

In a species like ours it is hardly ever the case that what an individual learns is free from influence by others. The structures and contents of our dwellings and workplaces, the constitutions of the domesticated plants and animals we interact with, the cultivated and engineered environments we live in, all have been affected by the activities of our predecessors.

The overlap between individual and social forms of learning has significance for research on non-human, as well as the human, species. The group of wild chimpanzees studied by Hobaiter et al. Some then began to make these sponges from moss instead. The researchers saw one individual develop this behaviour because she re-used an old moss sponge, which had previously been discarded by another chimp. But she did not do this because she had seen the sponge in use. As that distinction blurs, so the further question of what culture consists in becomes less clear Lewens For there are numerous ways in which activities of one generation can, by altering or maintaining stable features of biotic, social and technical environments, have an influence over what individuals in the following generations end up learning.

These phenomena are recognised by many prominent theorists of cultural evolution. Laland et al. Critics of these final comments e. Clarke and Heyes have urged that we seek more detailed information concerning whether individual learning—which, as we have seen, can take place in felicitously structured environments—truly is less sophisticated than forms of learning that attend directly to the behaviours of others. We need to ask both whether there is an additional form of sophistication in the cognitive mechanisms that underpin social compared with individual learning, and also whether social learning has greater functionality, specifically with respect to the generation of increasingly refined behaviours, technologies, norms and institutions across populations.

These are just the types of questions to which the methods of cultural evolutionary work—which combine populational modelling with work in cognitive science—are well placed to give answers. Darwinism epistemology: evolutionary evolution heritability James, William natural selection psychology: evolutionary replication and reproduction Spencer, Herbert. What is Cultural Evolution? Natural Selection and Cultural Inheritance 3. Historical Pedigree 4. Memes 5. Problems with Memes 6. Cultural Evolution without Memes 7. Population Thinking 9. Cultural Attraction Cumulative Culture Evolvability Cultural Phylogenies Natural Selection and Cultural Inheritance In a classic early work of cultural evolution, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman ask among other things how we can explain declining birth rates among Italian women in the nineteenth century.

Historical Pedigree The notion that culture itself evolves, and that Darwinian insights can be applied to understanding cultural change, is by no means new. A very early example of cultural evolutionary thinking comes from William James: A remarkable parallel, which to my mind has never been noticed, obtains between the facts of social evolution and the mental growth of the race, on the one hand, and of zoological evolution, as expounded by Mr Darwin, on the other. Both factors are essential to change. Darwin writes: …if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or weapon…the plainest self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus profit…If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant other tribes…In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there would always be a rather greater chance of the birth of other superior and inventive members.

Darwin , Finally, Darwin endorses the view, widely favoured these days, that natural selection need not act on organisms. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent value. Indeed, at one point in the Descent of Man , Darwin quotes Spencer at length and with approval: Our great philosopher, Herbert Spencer, has recently explained his views on the moral sense. Memes Serious efforts to construct cultural evolutionary theories can be traced to the work of Lumsden and Wilson , Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman , and Boyd and Richerson Sperber , —65 Both of these concerns raise serious problems for the generality of memetics: not all ideas are replicators, hence not all ideas are memes.

The Explanatory Role of Cultural Evolutionary Theories At the beginning of this entry it was claimed that the case for cultural evolution was irresistible. If they are, then their explanations will not be undermined by precise models of cultural evolution. If they are not, then social scientists should correct their explanations and the intuitions on which they rely by studying these models. Cumulative Culture Some theorists begin their presentations of cultural evolutionary theory by arguing that cultural change meets the conditions for evolution by natural selection stressed by Darwin.

Evolvability A closely related way to vindicate models of cultural evolution looks to the question of the general features of inheritance systems that make for evolvability in a lineage. Cultural Phylogenies Many evolutionists have argued that biological tools can have great value when we wish to develop a historical view of the pattern of cultural change see, for example, Gray at al , Mace and Holden this section itself draws on Lewens Individual learning refers to situations in which individuals learn by observing or interacting directly with their environment Bibliography Barrett, P.

Birch, J. Boyd, R. Aunger ed. Buskell, A. Cavalli-Sforza, L. Claidiere, N. Darwin, C. Dawkins, R. Deacon, T. Driscoll, C. Godfrey-Smith, P. Gould, S. Gray, R. Griffiths, P. Harris, P. Henrich, J. Heyes, C. Hobaiter, C. Jablonka, E. James, W. Kline, M. Kuper, A. Lack, D. Laland, K. Lewens, T. Get the latest news from the world of sport along with the best opinion from our outstanding team of sport writers, direct to your inbox every Friday. Puzzles hub. Visit our brain gym where you will find simple and cryptic crosswords, sudoku puzzles and much more.

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